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INCORPORATING
DEVELOPMENT INTO PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY
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Jessica F. Jablonski and David Lester |
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Richard Stockton College, Pomona, New
Jersey, USA
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Abstract
The ideas of Werner (1957) and Mehrabian (1968) are used to suggest how
developmental processes can be introduced into George Kelly’s personal
construct theory, and the major theories of human development (Freud, Erikson,
Ainsworth and others) are explored for their implications for the content of
constructs that individuals develop over time. Ten critical questions for
Personal Construct Theory are posed to stimulate further theory and research on
these issues.
Keywords: development, personal construct theory, Heinz Werner.
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George Kelly’s (1955) theory of personal
constructs envisions every person as a scientist who comes up with hypotheses
or predictions about the world, including everyday events and social
interactions, based on their own system of ‘constructs.’ Depending on the
validation or invalidation of a construct, a person may keep the construct,
modify it, or get rid of it. In this way, “personality is continually taking
new shape” (p. 57). It is clear, therefore, that Kelly’s theory involves change
in the constructs and construct systems of individuals.
However, although Kelly’s theory allows for
change, the theory provides a phenomenological description of the individual at
a particular point in time and lacks a developmental orientation (Crockett,
1982), a complaint that Fransella and Neimeyer (2003) noted is frequently
advanced. Indeed, Fransella (1995) noted that this omission was deliberate. Vaughn
and Pfenninger (1994) argued that a developmental orientation was incompatible
with Kelly’s theory. Focusing on stage theories, they argued that stage
theories have two components: (1) stages have inevitable structure or content,
and (2) stage theories involve directionality. Both of these are incompatible
with Kelly’s theory, according to Vaughn and Pfenninger. Vaughn and Pfenninger
argued that individuals are “never bound by past constructions to arrive
inevitably at specific new constructions” (p. 182). As for the directionality
of development, Vaughn and Pfenninger noted that people can progress or
regress. There is no one direction for all individuals to take. Vaughn and
Pfenninger gave examples of how change can occur in Kelly’s theory (see
below), but they rejected development.
In contrast, this essay seeks to provide
suggestions for a developmental component for Kelly’s theory, drawing on the
work of Werner (1957) and Mehrabian (1968).
To sharpen the argument here, a series of critical questions is proposed, some
of which have occasionally been considered by personal construct theorists, but
some of which have not.
DEVELOPMENT
VERSUS CHANGE
Many personal construct theorists use the
term ‘development’ to mean change rather than changes over the life-span found
in most, if not all, people (e.g., Sigel & Holmgren, 1983). Anderson (1990) asserted
that “personality development follows from a person’s unique construction of
experience” (p. 81), and the emphasis on uniqueness hinders the formulation of
developmental changes common to all individuals.
As Viney (1992) pointed out, Kelly’s theory
contains many suggestions as to how change might take place. For
example, construction systems can change though: (1) modifications in the
meaning of constructs if the constructs are permeable, that is, if they allow
new elements into both poles of the construct; (2) anxiety, which is aroused
through our inability to construe what we are experiencing, leading to efforts
to change our construction system; (3) the receipt of disconfirming evidence
after we have made a prediction can lead to either realistic acceptance and
change or to hostile maneuvers; and (4) the creativity cycle involves loosening
and then tightening constructs in order to generate new ideas. Viney noted that
change is easier for peripheral constructs than for core constructs and that
change occurs in times of transition (when an individual moves from one
situation to another, such as graduating from college) and in times of crisis.
These four processes involve change but they do not provide a developmental
explanation.
Developmental explanations focus, not only
on common changes in psychological processing over the life-span, but also on
the causes of particular end-points. For example, why do some individuals
accept disconfirming evidence while others adopt hostile maneuvers? What early
experiences shaped this choice? How might we raise children so that they can
engage easily in the creativity cycle (moving from tight to loose and back to
tight construing)? This kind of explanation is lacking in Kelly’s theory.
HEINZ
WERNER’S PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT
The standard developmental path in systems
theory is that, “….it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of
differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and
hierarchic integration” (Werner, 1957, p. 126). This results in an increasing
number of relatively autonomous units and increasing integration between these
units, which implies an increasing number of interrelationships between the
units.
In personal construct theory, the basic
units are constructs and there is an overall system of constructs. Not all
constructs are equivalent. One construct may, for example, be an element to be
classified in another construct. Constructs may, therefore, be arranged
hierarchically, with superordinate constructs subsuming subordinate constructs.
For example, the subordinate construct intelligent-stupid
may be one element of a superordinate construct ‘the kind of person I like
versus the kind of person I dislike.’
Furthermore, the Fragmentation Corollary
(Kelly, 1955, p. 83) states that “A person may successively employ a variety of
construction subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with each other.”
This corollary implies that there are subsystems within the system. Kelly
coined the term suspension to describe the situation in which the person
operates on one subsystem of constructs while ignoring input from other
subsystems of constructs.
One critical question is how many
subsystems of constructs an individual has. In factor analyses of REP Grids,
one measure of cognitive complexity is the number of factors (clusters of
constructs) that are identified. Might the number of factors be a measure of
how many subsystems an individual possesses?
Critical
Question 1: How many
subsystems of constructs make up an individual’s construction system and which
factors have an impact on changes in this number over time.
A second critical question is how many levels there may be in the
construction system of an individual between the system as a whole and the
individual constructs. Are there only subsystems, or can there be
subsubsystems, subsubsubsystems, and so on? A simple account of development is
that the number of levels increases as the individual matures and the number of
units within each level also increases. Just as Kelly proposed that the
construction system as a whole was made up of a finite number of constructs
(the Dichotomy Corollary), we can propose that there are a finite number of
levels and a finite number of units within each level.
Critical
question 2: How many
levels exist in an individual’s construction (subsystems, subsubsystems, etc)
and what developmental factors affect this?
Kelly proposed that alternative sets of
constructs typically exist, and some are suspended while the individual makes
decisions based on one set. In light of this, holistic theories such as that of
Andras Angyal (1965) and Eric Berne (1961) raise important questions of
interaction and coordination between these subsystems,
an issue highlighted by Crockett (1982) who noted two important aspects of
relations between constructs: (1) a hierarchical organization into
superordinate and subordinate constructs, and (2) the implications that constructs
have for one another, as in constellatory construing.
Honess (1979) classified the constructs as
concrete (e.g., based on appearance) versus abstract (e.g., based on
personality traits) and examined (by means of the Grid) whether one construct implied
(or was implied by) another (analogous to the concept of contellatory versus
prepositional construing). Honess documented changes in the direction predicted
by Werner’s ideas for children aged 8 to 13, but the changes were clearer in
the girls than in the boys.
Critical
Question 3: If the mind is
conceptualized as comprised of several construction systems, some of which are
suspended while one has executive power, how do these part-systems interact and
coordinate?
HOW
DO CONSTRUCTS CHANGE WITH AGE?
The major developmental psychology theories suggest explanations of
why and how constructs might change as people get older. Viney (1992) noted
three developmental processes. First, constructs move from being preemptive and
concrete in young children to being more flexible and abstract. Second, the
system of constructs becomes more differentiated but also more integrated over
time. Third, the content of the constructs changes over time. However, Viney
did not elaborate on these processes.
The nature of constructs in childhood
Using general concepts and
processes put forth by developmental psychologists, some proposals for the
changes that might occur in constructs and in construct systems during
childhood can be made, namely that constructs become more abstract,
differentiated and integrated (Applegate, 1983) and less concrete, sparse and
globally organized.
As we move from sensorimotor to perceptual
to cognitive functioning, each level involves more differentiation and more
hierarchical organization and an increasing differentiation of the self from
the environment (Mehrabian, 1968). Mehrabian, in his discussion of cognitive
development, proposed that the existence of many subordinate and less abstract
cognitions (here we can substitute the term constructs) makes it easier to
develop superordinate or abstract constructs since development involves
increasing differentiation and integration of existing constructs.
Mehrabian noted that development may be
uneven. An individual may have a highly developed set of constructs for his or
her profession, but a less developed set of constructs for interpersonal
relationships or vice versa. Kelly’s theory takes this into account in his
definition of aggression versus passivity. The aggressive person actively
elaborates his perceptual field in a particular area and, therefore, could
eventually develop a developmentally mature set of constructs for this area.
Critical
Question 4: What factors
determine the extent to which individuals develop abstract constructs?
Critical Question
5: What factors
determine the unevenness in construct development (that is, why certain areas
are less developed than others)?
Research on constructs in childhood
Salmon (1985)
argued against the limitations of traditional developmental psychology with its
emphasis on the incompetence of children. The approach of personal construct
theory can provide a more growth-oriented, humanistic view of the cognitive
abilities and cognitive development of children. There has been some personal
construct research on the constructs of children and the development of their
constructs, although the methodology used by some of the research (such as
providing constructs rather than eliciting constructs) has been criticized
(Klion & Leitner, 1985).
Klion and Leitner (1985) used an
elicitation technique and found that the type of constructs elicited from
children changed from kindergarten to 6th grade (age 12). Constructs
based on appearance became less frequent with increasing age, constructs
involving behavior peaked in 4th graders (aged 10), while constructs
involving social roles and constructs involving personality became more common
with increasing age. Similar results were reported by Barratt (1977) in a study
of children aged 8 to 14. This seems to indicate that constructs become more
abstract as children become older.
Scarlett,
Press, and Crockett (1971) attempted to test some of Werner’s ideas using
children by eliciting constructs from essays that the children wrote about
their peers. They found that the total number of constructs used by the
children increased with age from 1st grade to 5th grade
(ages 6 to 11), and there was a transition from egocentric and concrete
constructs to non-egocentric and abstract constructs.
Adams-Webber (2003) reviewed research on
children and adolescents that shows that their ability to differentiate
themselves from others increases progressively during this period and, in
particular, to differentiate themselves from their parents, both same sex
parents and opposite sex parents. Differentiation in constructs is often
operationally defined as cognitive complexity, and Vacc and Greenleaf (1975)
found that a measure of cognitive complexity increased in a regular fashion in
3rd grade children to 7th grade children (ages 9 and 13,
respectively),with adults scoring even higher on cognitive complexity. Brook
(1981), in a very small sample of adults, found evidence that cognitive
complexity peaks in middle age (25-60 years) and declines thereafter. Deitch
and Jones (1983) studied adults and found that the content of constructs
elicited by the REP Test changed with the level of ego-development (Loevinger,
1966), with factually descriptive constructs becoming less common and
self-sufficiency and emotional arousal constructs becoming more common.
It is noteworthy that much of the relevant
research has focused on young children and early adolescents. Much less
research has been conducted on young, middle-aged and elderly adults. However,
Applegate (1983) noted that research seems to suggest that development in the
abstract nature of constructs is more noticeable in late adolescence and
adulthood than is an increase in complexity.
Another question commonly asked in
developmental psychology is whether psychological processes change gradually
with increasing age or whether clear stages can be identified. The research
studies reviewed above support a ‘gradual change’ perspective,
but it is of interest to explore whether a stage theory of development in
personal construct theory can be proposed.
Critical
Question 6: How do the
processes in personal construct theory change with age?
Critical
Question 7: What are the
typical developmental stages for constructs and construct systems across the
life-span, from childhood to old age?
Critical
question 8: Can a stage
theory for the development of construction systems be proposed?
THE
CONTENT OF CONSTRUCTS ACROSS THE LIFE-SPAN
Personal construct theory is concerned less than other
theories of personality with the content of constructs and with regularities in
the content that are common to all individuals. There are many stage theories
of development, both for the early years and across the life-span, that could
provide the basis for describing commonalities in the constructs that people
develop. Thus, all of the classic developmental theories provide suggestions
for commonalities in the constructs that develop.
In his proposal of the psychosexual stages
of development, Freud described five stages of development for desires and in
the issues that confront children and adolescents: oral, anal, phallic, puberty
and genital. Constructs could be formed based on the desires, frustrations and
issues of each stage. For example, oral frustrations and fixations could be the
basis for some constructs, such as receiving too much gratification or not
enough gratification during this stage. A person may continue to expect that
they should receive too much or too little satisfaction and behave according to
these expectations. Fixations may, therefore, imply that some of the
individual’s constructs will be concerned with these issues, issues such as
dependency and trust as well as, more directly, oral desires.
Erikson (1959) proposed an eight stage
psychosocial (rather than psychosexual) theory of development. Breaking down each
phase of the entire lifespan enables us to consider how constructs related to
different aspects of the self may develop over time according to our age.
Constructs related to basic trust, autonomy, initiative, and industry may
develop based on our experiences in childhood, whereas constructs related to
identity, intimacy with others, as well as our sense of generativity and
integrity, may develop as we grow older.
Object Relations theorists have expanded on
Freud’s ideas. For example, Fairbairn (1954) proposed that, during infancy, the
child takes into the psyche different parts of the mother - good objects and
bad objects. At first the child is only able to see the mother as being all
good or all bad at one moment in time (splitting) but, somewhere around the age
of two, the child becomes able to integrate these parts and see that the mother
has both good and bad qualities at the same time. These good and the bad
objects developed in infancy are thought to influence long-term personality
development, and what an individual from then on sees as ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ by
means of the process called identification. Kelly construed identification as
setting up a new construct in which a person, say mother, anchors the construct
similar to mother v. not similar to
mother, with the self classified at the former pole. However, we may also
use identification in the traditional psychoanalytic sense of taking in a
complete construct used by, say, a parent. A parent may use the construct intelligent-stupid frequently, and the
child may introject this construct. Thus, one source of constructs may be
introjection. Furthermore, the good and bad objects, as conceptualized in
Fairbairn’s theory, may also form constructs or the poles of objects.
John Bowlby (1982) put forth a
theory of attachment between parent and child based on the child’s instinctual
motivation for survival. Somewhat similar to Kelly, Bowlby acknowledged the
importance of “working models” in conceptualizing how an infant develops an
attachment to a caregiver. He suggested that an infant needs to keep the
working model in his mind “up-to-date” by taking in all of the necessary pieces
of information from his surroundings, including those related to his caregiver.
Bowlby believed that only occasionally do these working models related to
attachment undergo “major change,” implying that they remain relatively
constant unless there is some “radical” change perceived in the environment,
such as the loss of a loved one (p. 80-82).
After observing mothers separate and then
reunite with their infants in laboratory and home settings, Ainsworth (2000), a
student of John Bowlby, distinguished between three types of attachment. The
first pattern has been labeled secure
attachment in which the child uses the mother as a “secure base from which to
explore” his or her surroundings. The child is happily able to play on his or
her own when mother is present because she creates a feeling security. When the
mother leaves, the child is at first distressed and then seeks comfort from her
when she returns. The second pattern of attachment is typically referred to as insecure resistant or ambivalent. This
is when the child becomes extremely distressed during separation from the
mother and appears to seek close contact when she returns, yet resists the
mother’s attempts at closeness. The third pattern of attachment is usually
called insecure avoidant in which the
child does not seem very distressed when separated from his or her mother and
appears to ignore the mother when reunited (Ainsworth, 2000).
There have been several studies that show a
relationship between early attachments to parents and later attachments to
significant others in adulthood. In light of Kelly’s theory, it is certainly
plausible that the attachment pattern individuals develop in childhood may
affect the constructs they develop about relationships. If during childhood one
gets used to a certain pattern of emotional closeness between himself and a
significant other, it may be that he will then predict that other significant
relationships will follow a similar pattern, and he may adopt his behavior
accordingly. For example, in Bowlby’s
own words,
... a young
child’s experience of an encouraging, supportive, and co-operative mother, and
a little later father, gives him a sense of worth, a belief in the helpfulness
of others, and a favourable model on which to build future relationships.
Furthermore, by enabling him to explore his environment with confidence and to
deal with it effectively, such experience promotes his sense of competence
(1982, p. 378).
Parenting styles, such as authoritative,
authoritarian, indulgent and neglectful (Maccoby & Martin, 1983) may also
play a role in shaping the child’s constructs. Kelly recognized that, if we
fail to meet another person’s expectations, our self-construct is affected even
if we did not agree with the other’s expectation to begin with. Kelly said that
this is a potent process during childhood based on our parents’ expectations of
us (Kelly, 1955, p. 177). Therefore, some of our constructs may be based on our
parents’ own constructs, especially our self construct based on our evaluation
of how well we have met, and continue to meet, our parents’ expectations of us,
as well as how much love and support we receive from them. Other relatives,
peers, teachers and people in the media may also play a role here.
More recent work on attachment would
generate more suggestions but, as can be seen from these few brief examples,
any psychological theory of development can provide suggestions for the content
of the constructs that people develop, and the ways in which their constructs
may change over time. Kelly, however, in his statement of his theory was not
overly concerned with the specific types of constructs used by people, that is,
the actual words used to anchor the constructs, words such as intelligent vs stupid. Kelly proposed no
constructs common to all individuals. The present paper disagrees with this
position and proposes that some constructs may be common because of the
inevitable stages we move through as children and because of situational forces
(from significant others and from the culture).
Of course, some of the authors mentioned
above emphasize the primacy of early experiences which is not necessary in a
personal construct theory of development, where the principle of constructive
alternativism (similar to the existential psychological concept of reframing)
permits reorganization of cognitive material into new structures which may be
independent of earlier interpretations. However, the developmental
psychologists mentioned above were cited only to provide examples of how such
theories might provide suggestions for commonalities in the content of people’s
constructs.
Critical
Question 9: Are there
commonalities in the content of constructs of people that can be related to the
classic stage theories of development?
THE
ROLE OF ANXIETY
Mehrabian proposed that a high level of
cognitive differentiation would lead to a more accurate predictive ability.
Kelly proposed that, on the whole, people try to extend and refine their
construction system, and refinement means making it a more accurate predictor
of events. Since anxiety is aroused by the inability to construe a situation,
maturity should be accompanied by lower levels of anxiety at any given level of
dilation/construction of the perceptual field.
Although individuals are, in Kelly’s
theory, motivated to extend and refine their construction system, not all
individuals are willing to dilate their perceptual field, thereby gaining new
experiences which force them in this direction. However, there are many
transitions in life that do force these situations upon the individual,
situations such as going off to school, moving from high school to university,
leaving one’s parents’ home, getting married, getting divorced, and falling
ill. If individuals are prepared to cope with these transitions, then their
construction systems will move to a higher level of development. If, on the
other hand, the transition is too difficult for them (perhaps the level of
anxiety aroused is too high), then they may withdraw into a safer (more
predictable world), thereby regressing to or fixating at a lower level of
development. Mehrabian suggested the common U-shaped function for this, that
is, development proceeds best when the level of anxiety aroused by transition s
is at an intermediate level.
CAUSALITY
We now come to the most important lacuna in
Personal Construct Psychology What factors affect, for example, whether
constructs become impermeable rather than permeable, tight rather than loose,
or propositional rather than constellatory. What experiences leads individuals
to dilate their perceptual field as a rule rather than to constrict their
perceptual field as a rule? Why are some individual hostile while others modify
their construction system given feedback?
Are there genetic and neurophysiological
factors that determine these styles, psychodynamic-relevant experiential
factors from the early years, the history of rewards and punishments (as in
classic learning theory), or situational factors (interpersonal, subcultural or
cultural)? These issues have been relatively ignored in Personal Construct
Theory, but they are important, even crucial, for the development of a more
encompassing theory of personal constructs. A provocative way of phrasing this
issue is to ask the question, how would we raise a person so that they
developed some trait or style. For example, how could we set out to raise a
person who constricted their perceptual field or who was unable ever to loosen
their construing, on so on.
Critical
Question 10: What factors
(neurophysiological, experiential or contextual) result
in (or cause) the individual’s particular phenomenological state (such as
permeable versus impermeable constructs, refusal to accept disconfirming
evidence, dilating versus constricting, etc.)
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present paper has been to
review writing on developmental aspects of George Kelly’s Personal Construct
Theory and to provide some hypotheses for developmental processes. We have
explored how Heinz Werner’s general theory of development can provide some
hypotheses, and we have illustrated how theories of human developmental can
provide suggestions as to how constructs and systems of constructs can change
and how early, formative influences can affect the development of constructs
and their properties. We have also identified major omissions in Personal
Construct Theory, namely (1) extending the study of changes in constructs from
adolescence through to old age and (2) identifying causes of the
properties proposed by Personal Construct Theory for constructs, systems of
constructs, the perceptual field and phenomenological states such as threat,
anxiety, aggression and hostility.
ENDNOTES
We include both understanding and explaining changes with age as
important tasks for personal construct theory. For a discussion of this
distinction, see Butt (2004).
The other measure of cognitive complexity, the amount of variance
accounted for by the first factor, seems less suitable as a measure of the
number of subsystems that an individual possesses.
See also Lester (2007) for additional possibilities of critical
questions for subsystems.
A detailed analysis of such implications was provided by Hinkle
(1965).
The relevance of Piaget’s (1958) concept of accommodation to these
changes has been noted (Crockett, 1982).
Crockett (1982) noted that there are several operational
definitions of cognitive complexity, with low correlations between them, and
that not all measures increase with age.
Crockett (1982) noted that the precise ages at which changes in
constructs occur varies from study to study.
A fourth attachment pattern called insecure disorganized/disoriented has been identified by Main and Solomon (1986).
A social constructivist position would be relevant to this latter
situation (Butt, 2004).
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ABOUT THE
AUTHORS
Jessica Jablonski, Psy.D., is a Visiting
Assistant Professor of Psychology at the Richard
Stockton College
on New Jersey.
Her interests are clinical psychology, and human development.
Email: Jessica.Jablonski@stockton.edu
David Lester, Ph.D., is Professor of
Psychology at the Richard Stockton College of New Jersey. He obtained his
doctorate at Brandeis
University where he
studied under Abraham Maslow and George Kelly. Email: David.Lester@stockton.edu
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REFERENCE
Jablonski, J. F., Lester, D. (2008). Incorporating development into personal construct theory.
Personal
Construct Theory & Practice, 5, 41-49, 2008.
(Retrieved from http://www.pcp-net.org/journal/pctp08/jablonski08.html)
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Received: 8 October 2008 – Accepted: 15 December 2008 –
Published: 23 December 2008
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