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PCP and philosophy of
science |
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The Position of
PCP in the
realm of philosophy of science is many faceted.
Having the person-as-scientist as the
model of person, it is assumed that PCP
is heavily dependent on the scientific approach, which usually implies
positions such as convergent realism, positivism and empiricism.
However, Kelly
is sometimes loose on the subject. Although heavily emphasizing
scientific
issues in his theory, he sees it differently to Comte’s positivism; he
is
emphatic that the world is real, yet he opposes the idea of PCP as a
realist
theory; even if strongly advocating the need for the testing of our
constructions like in empiricism, those constructions are not seen as
raw sensory
data, but as artifacts of the human mind – like in rationalism. This is
the
outcome of Kelly’s avant-garde thinking which anticipated the state of
the art
of modern philosophy of science in which many important contemporary
theories
were developed after inclusion of PCP in the public domain.
Keeping this in mind,
(1) |
PCP can be seen as an example of relativist
rather than realist theory (although not denying the existence of the
world, it
implies the necessity of the frame of reference – a construct system –
in order
to approach this existence which otherwise would not be intelligible);
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(2) |
it is
much more likely a form of relationism
than essentialism (advocating an epistemological assumption of
ontological
primacy of relations over essence); |
(3) |
it is aligned with the principles of participativist
epistemology and is not a
case of an objectivist approach to knowledge
(claiming that a person is always the part of the picture (s)he
perceives,
coming to know the world not from its inherent properties, but from his
constructs which necessarily mediate every act of knowledge) and
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(4) |
it is
congruent with the principles of potentialism
rather than actualism (seeing
the condition of human beings as an ever
changing
process, not as a structure with fixed properties that have to be
discovered;
therefore human beings do not have a given nature, but an endless
potential of
forming unlimited repertory of constructions which can be placed over
people,
changing their nature every time these constructs are changed). |
Therefore, the
science of person-as-scientist is much
more germane with theories of
contemporary physics, than with Newtonian approach.
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References
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Dušan Stojnov
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